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Abstract
The energy stored in the nominal LHC beams is two times 362 MJ, 100 times the energy of the Tevatron. As little as
1 mJ/cm3 deposited energy quenches a magnet at 7 TeV and 1 J/cm3 causes magnet damage. The beam dumps are the
only places to safely dispose of this beam. One of the key systems for machine protection is the beam loss monitoring
(BLM) system. About 3600 ionization chambers are installed at likely or critical loss locations around the LHC ring.
The losses are integrated in 12 time intervals ranging from 40 μs to 84 s and compared to threshold values defined in 32
energy ranges. A beam abort is requested when potentially dangerous losses are detected or when any of the numerous
internal system validation tests fails. In addition, loss data are used for machine set-up and operational verifications.
The collimation system for example uses the loss data for set-up and regular performance verification. Commissioning
and operational experience of the BLM are presented: The machine protection functionality of the BLM system has
been fully reliable; the LHC availability has not been compromised by false beam aborts.
c© 2011 CERN. Published by Elsevier BV. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee
for TIPP 2011.
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1. Machine Protection for Proton Beam Operation
The LHC holds the world record for hadron collider luminosity: 4.67 × 1032 cm−2s−1 on 21 April. By
mid August 2011 the integrated luminosity delivered to all four experiments had already reached 5.5 fb−1,
and the peak luminosity delivered to ATLAS and CMS had reached 2.2 × 1033 cm−2s−1. Table 1 compares
the parameters of the LHC as of mid August 2011 with the nominal design values. The LHC is running at
half its nominal energy and twice its nominal bunch spacing. The bunch intensity is 17% above nominal
and the normalized transverse emittances are a factor of 1.9 smaller than nominal. Due to the lower energy
and bigger beta function at the collision points of ATLAS and CMS, the transverse beam sizes at collision
are about a factor of 1.7 bigger than at nominal conditions. The peak luminosity at the Altas and CMS
experiments as of August 2011 was a factor of 4.5 below nominal. ALICE and LHCb luminosities on the
other hand are not limited by LHC performance, but by the experiments’ desiderata. The LHC aims at
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further reducing the collision beta function for ATLAS and CMS to 1.0 m at the beginning of September
2011.
Table 1. LHC parameters at collision as of mid August 2011 compared to the nominal design values.
August 2011 Nominal
Energy per beam 3.5 TeV 7 TeV
Bunch spacing 50 ns 25 ns
Bunches per beam 1380 2808
Bunch intensity 1.35 × 1011 p 1.15 × 1011 p
Intensity per beam 1.86 × 1014 p 3.2 × 1014 p
Transverse normalized emittance ∼ 2 μm rad 3.75 μm rad
β∗ (ATLAS and CMS) 1.5 m 0.55 m
Peak luminosity (ATLAS and CMS) 2.2 × 1033 cm−2s−1 1.0 × 1034 cm−2s−1
Energy per beam 105 MJ 362 MJ
The energy stored in one LHC beam has already surpassed 100 MJ in July 2011. One nominal LHC
beam at 7 TeV will hold 362 MJ and 10 GJ will be contained in the magnets. A tiny fraction of this energy
can cause serious material damage. The estimated quench and damage limits at 7 TeV are 1 mJ/cm3 and
1 J/cm3 respectively. Even the destruction of the complete LHC is possible in case of a catastrophic failure
of the protection system. The damage of one magnet would amount to a downtime of months and cost about
one million USD. Quenching of a magnet can cause up to several hours of downtime. Two incidents in the
past highlight the destruction potential: In June 2008 [1] an incident in the SPS at 400 GeV with a beam
of 2 MJ slit open the vacuum chamber over a length of 10 cm. In October 2004 [2] a 450 GeV full LHC
injection batch of 3.4×1013 protons in 288 bunches (2.5 MJ) caused a 25 cm long cut in the vacuum chamber.
Beam intensities below the ‘set-up beam limit’, which has been derived from material damage studies [3],
are considered safe for the machine: 5× 1011 protons at injection energy (450 GeV) and 3.15× 1010 protons
at 3.5 TeV.
The LHC machine protection system (see Figure 1) comprises several 10’000 channels from about 250
input connections. They feed the beam interlock system (BIS), which transmits the beam dump request.
About 3600 out of 4000 BLM channels are configured to demand a beam abort if a loss above the pre-
defined threshold value is detected. 21% of the machine protection aborts above injection energy from 2010
till mid August 2011 came from the BLM system. Table 2 gives the number of aborts by system.
Table 2. Protection aborts from 2010 till mid August 2011 for energies above injection energy per system.
Magnet System (incl. Cryogenics) 134 Experiments Interlock 16
Beam Loss Monitors 96 False Beam Dump by MP System 16
Software Interlock System 45 Quench Protection System 14
Orbit Excursion Extr. Region 36 Beam Dumping System 14
Collimator Interlock 31 Beam Interlock System 14
Fast Magnet Current Change Monitors 25 Access System 2
RF Interlock 16 Aperture Kicker 1
2. BLM System
The main aim of the BLM system [4] is to prevent damage of machine components and magnet quenches
due to beam losses. The second crucial aspect of the system is beam loss surveillance which helps to
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Fig. 1. Overview of the machine protection system. Each input channel individually can request a beam abort via the beam interlock
system.
diagnose the cause of the losses. About 3600 parallel plate Ionization Chambers (IC) filled with nitrogen gas
at 1.1 bar are installed at likely or critical loss locations, most of them around the quadrupole magnets. 97%
of these monitors are connected to the BIS. A few ICs are for observational purposes only: ICs in the dump
lines, monitors installed for future upgrade elements, and redundant monitors with RC-delay filter. 300
Secondary Emission Monitors (SEM) with a 70’000 times smaller sensitivity are used for observation only.
In the LHC arcs, the front-end electronics are installed below the quadrupole magnets. They are tested to be
radiation-tolerant up to 500 Gy. In the straight sections, due to the higher radiation, the front-end electronics
are housed in side tunnels, leading to analogue signal transmission cables of up to 800 m. As these long
cables were shown to be sensitive to electromagnetic interference (EMI), new front-end electronics with a
radiation tolerance of up to 10 kGy are currently being developed. They will be placed close to the monitors
in the straight sections. The tunnel electronics holds a Current-to-Frequency-Converter (CFC) and a parallel
ADC, which is used to increase the low end of the dynamic range, as well as an FPGA for signal counting
and multiplexing. The signal is transmitted optically to the surface, where the comparison with the threshold
values and the connection to the BIS is made. The digital part of the readout chain is doubled to satisfy the
required design dependability.
The loss signals are integrated during 12 diﬀerent time intervals, ranging from 40 μs (about half the
duration of one turn) to 84 s. In addition, the abort thresholds depend on the beam energy; they are defined
in 32 energy intervals. Hence, each monitor has 12× 32 beam abort thresholds associated. Determining and
manipulating these threshold values is critical to the safety of the LHC; tools and procedures are described
in [5]. With few exceptions, the thresholds are set according to a local protection strategy. They are deter-
mined based on measurements and extensive simulations of the impact distribution of lost beam particles,
of the development of hadronic showers through the magnets / machine elements, of the energy deposition
in the magnets, of the critical energy deposition for quench and damage, of the radiation field at the monitor
location, and of the monitor response. Thresholds for collimators and protective masks are set according
to operational scenarios; hence their thresholds are typically much lower than the associated damage level.
At the start-up of the LHC, thresholds were typically set conservatively. As the beam intensity and the
luminosity were increasing, it was also necessary to increase the thresholds.
Each monitor aborts the beam if any one of 12 loss integrals is above the threshold, or if one of its
internal tests fails. The system test validation procedures [6, 7] have been defined to achieve the required
dependability of the system. The functionality of all components was tested before installation. Thereafter,
there are three diﬀerent inspection frequencies: tests after installation and during yearly maintenance, tests
before each fill and tests which take place continuously including the time of beam operation. Figure 2 lists
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Fig. 2. Overview of the most important BLM testing procedures. The colored bars indicate which part of the system is tested at
which frequency. The barcode check for example is used to test all cable connections from the detector till the combiner card during
installation and after maintenance. Some procedures test only certain parts or functionalities of the electronics, indicated by the length
of the colored bar. The current source test e.g. is verifying the cable connection between the detector and the tunnel electronics and
the analogue part of the tunnel electronics. The digital transmission part of the tunnel electronics is not covered by this test, but for
example by the radioactive source test.
the most important tests and their frequencies. Additional machine protection tests [8], mostly verifications
of the above system tests, have been executed during the commissioning phase. Before start-up and before
a new release the firmware is tested extensively for all operational aspects. Every time an issue is detected,
a dedicated test covering the issue is added to the firmware test procedure. This ensures that there are no
regressions when a new firmware version is introduced.
The ‘vertical slice’ test is executed on a test system located at the LHC point IP2: The complete hardware
chain from the ionization chamber to the beam interlock output is verified. A specific part of the test uses a
front-end emulator of the analogue part of the electronics. It allows for exhaustive threshold triggering tests,
optical link reception and status tests, and verification of the response to predefined input signal patterns
(linearity tests, etc.).
Performance tests with beam include beam aborts with defined injection losses on a closed collimator
and measurements of the reaction time of the BLM from injection to breaking of the beam permit loop by
the BLM. The validation tests between fills are enforced by the BLM system to be executed at least once
every 24 hours, otherwise the next injection into the LHC is inhibited. The tests are executed and analyzed
in BLM surface electronics FPGAs (combiner cards) and take about 7 minutes to execute. Three tests are
executed on each monitor: A comparison of system parameters including thresholds between data base and
surface electronics, an internal (VME crate) beam permit line test, and a connectivity check by modulation
of the chamber high voltage.
During start-up and commissioning of the LHC, the machine protection functionalities of the BLM
system had been switched on in stages. This way, they provided the required protection level depending on
the damage potential of the beam, without compromising the machine availability. The input to BIS from
individual monitors was switched from masked to unmasked in stages. The abort request from a ‘masked’
monitor is ignored when the ‘set-up beam’ flag is true. Most of the channels had been unmasked by the end
of 2009. Similarly, the system validation tests became active in stages, with almost all of them active before
the 2010 re-start.
3. Dependability - Reliability, Availability and Safety
There is no evidence of a single beam loss event having been missed by the BLMs. No avoidable quench,
nor any component damage occurred. All beam induced quenches were either intentional (quench tests) or
occurred with injected beam, which cannot be avoided by BLMs. The number of false beam aborts due
to hardware failures are as expected and within requirements. Mostly, the onset of a system degradation
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was detected by regular oﬀ-line checks before malfunctioning, and components could be replaced in the
shadow of other interventions. Noise events never caused beam aborts. No big deviation has been detected
between the protection thresholds and the magnet quench levels. Key elements leading to this outstanding
performance of the BLM system have been:
1. A Safety Integrity level (SIL) approach to the system design using a downtime cost evaluation as input
2. Extensive system tests at all stages of system design, construction and operation
3. Internal and external review procedures during the system design and the commissioning phase
Several design choices were lead by the dependability [6] analysis. It was assumed that 100 dangerous
beam losses per year would occur, which can only be detected by one BLM. 96 actual emergency dumps for
energies above injection energy in 1.5 years show that this number was quite realistic. But we consistently
observe higher protection redundancy, with several local monitors and monitors at aperture limits observing
the dangerous losses. Table 3 summarizes the requirements and predictions for damage risk and the number
of false beam dumps and compares them to 2010 and 2011 experiences.
Table 3. Damage risk and false dumps for one year required and predicted by simulation compared to observations in 2010 and 2011
(January - June).
per year Requirement Simulation 2010 (above 450 GeV) 2011 (beam with damage potential)
Damage risk < 10−3 5 × 10−4 – –
False dumps < 20 10 - 17 3 (7 - 14 per year
of standard operation)
3
Nevertheless, several system changes had become necessary after the 2010 start-up. Hardware as well
as firmware and threshold changes are highly safety-critical operations, which require approval and change
procedures and dedicated extensive systems test, e.g. the ‘vertical slice test’ for firmware changes.
1. The upper end of the dynamic range for short losses was extended for certain ICs by a factor of 10 or
a factor of 180 by adding an RC-delay filter. This became necessary because at 23 Gy/s the current
from an IC reaches the upper end of the electronics measurement range while the SEMs are plagued
by spurious signals due to ionization in air at connections and EMI issues mostly due to their long
cables.
2. At certain locations the particle showers from upstream loss locations (non-local losses) had to be
added to the local protection thresholds. This concerns the collimation regions and the injection
energy thresholds in the injection regions. On a small sub-set of these locations protection of the
element is not ensured any more by the locally installed BLM, but by other monitors in the vicinity
(non-local protection).
3. Thresholds of all cold magnets had been tuned for the 2011 start-up based on 2010 experience (see
below).
4. Three updates of the FPGA firmware of the processing module (surface electronics for threshold
comparison etc.) were performed during the early commissioning phase of 2010, and one more before
the 2011 start-up. The changes included: the activation of the beam abort request in the case of an
internal system test discovering a failure; the implementation of recommendations from the external
audits; the addition of new status information such as the RC-delay filter values of each channel, as
the installation of RC-delay filters had not been envisaged before 2010. During the LHC operation
period, modifications of this critical firmware are to be avoided for dependability considerations.
Nevertheless, one firmware update per year was required during the running periods of 2010 and 2011.
Both of them were declared absolutely necessary, as their aim was to solve intermittent problems with
the data recording of the post-mortem circular buﬀer, and to change the functionality of the beam
injection and extraction buﬀers to compensate for limitations of the network infrastructure.
5. One important limitation concerning the system safety was detected in 2011 when a cable powering
a set of detectors was cut on the surface during a period without beam. This event was detected by
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the internal monitoring, but the system had not been specified to immediately revoke the beam permit
in such an event. The beam permit loop was only opened during the regular system check before the
subsequent beam injection, correctly inhibiting injection into the LHC. This safety hole was closed
by adding a software interlock on the high voltage status flags of the BLM system. In the winter
break, hardware and firmware updates will replace the software interlock, as for reliability purposes
all interlocks of the BLM system have to be performed by hardware.
Figure 3 presents an arc quadrupole (MQ) monitor as example of the threshold adaptations of the cold
magnets at the 2011 start-up. The changes were based on measurements of quench tests at injection and
with circulating beams, on accidental quenches of dipole magnets at injection, on tests with wire scanner
induced losses and on ‘UFO’ losses (see below). In black are the 2011 applied thresholds, with the dots
denoting the 12 integration time windows. The blue line shows the 2010 applied thresholds. Green dots are
measurements of ‘UFO’ losses at MQs which did not quench the magnets, and red dots are measurements
during quench tests, when the magnet actually quenched. The applied thresholds are intended to be a factor
three below the magnet quench level. For integration times up to several ms, the thresholds were increased
by a factor of 3-5, and for integration times above 0.08 s the thresholds were reduced by a factor of 3.
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Fig. 3. Threshold changes for cold magnets at the 2011 start-up and the measurements on which they were based, shown for the
example of a monitor in the arc. In black are the 2011 applied thresholds, with the dots denoting the 12 integration time windows. The
blue line shows the 2010 thresholds. Measurements of diﬀerent cold magnet types have been combined to define the threshold update.
MB are main arc dipole magnet. MQML, MQY and MBRB are magnets located in the insertion regions.
4. Beam Loss Surveillance
Beam loss measurements play a crucial part in understanding and tuning the machine performance [9].
Every second logging data records one value for each of the 12 integration intervals for oﬄine analysis.
For integration times below one second, the maximum during the previous second is stored, for the longer
integration intervals the last value is saved. This way short losses are also adequately recorded and their
duration can be reconstructed to ≈ 20-30% using the logging data. This data set is also used for online
display. Furthermore, various data buﬀers are read out on request. These event-triggered buﬀers are used
for post-mortem, collimation movement (to be implemented), injection and extraction validation, and for
special studies like the study of ‘UFO’ losses. See Table 4 for details.
4.1. Fast ms-time-scale Losses
Fast, localized losses, typically on the ms time scale, surpassing the BLM or the LHC experiment thresh-
olds have lead to 35 beam aborts, 17 in 2010 and 18 in 2011 [10]. 13 of these losses occurred around the
injection kickers (MKI), 6 aborts were requested by one of the experiments (alone or together with the BLM
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Table 4. Buﬀer data of the LHC BLM system. The readout is triggered by timing events.
BLM Buﬀer Modes Integration
Time
Buﬀer Length
Post Mortem 40 μs 80 ms online,
1.72 s oﬄine
Collimation Buﬀer 2.6 ms 80 ms
Extraction Validation 40 μs 80 ms
Capture Data
Injection Quality Check (8 crates) 40 μs 20 ms
Study Buﬀer (e.g. ‘UFO’ study) 80 μs Dynamic,
currently up to 350 ms
system) and only one beam abort happened at injection energy. These losses are believed to be caused by
macro particles intercepting the beam, hence they have been dubbed UFOs for Unidentified Falling Objects.
These losses occur all around the LHC, even at locations which are otherwise free of losses, for example in
the arcs. Each UFO is detected by several local monitors and by the BLMs at global aperture restrictions.
Most of the events are far below the abort thresholds, and the number of UFOs decreases inversely propor-
tional with the magnitude of the loss signal. Stepwise increases of the BLM abort thresholds in the relevant
integration times during 2010 and at the start-up of 2011 reduced the number of beam dumps. The events
also became less frequent. From 10 UFOs per hour above detection levels at the beginning of 2011 they
decreased to 3-4 per hour towards the end of the year. However, when the energy of the LHC increases, the
magnet quench levels will decrease and at the same time the particle showers from the UFOs will deposit
more energy in the magnets. This could possibly be a problem for the machine availability.
4.2. Losses at the Collimators
The collimation insertions are designed to concentrate the losses: betatron losses at LHC point 7 and
longitudinal losses at point 3. The BLMs installed directly at the collimators are essential for collimation
set-up and cleaning performance verification. Dedicated beams are used for these purposes. Collimation
cleaning verification measurements (so called loss maps) are performed regularly, every 4 weeks, by blowing
up a beam of 1 or 2 bunches in either the horizontal, vertical or longitudinal direction. The analysis of the
resulting three ‘loss maps’ per beam yields the cleaning performance.
To identify the dominant loss type, a program was developed which decomposes the loss pattern into
the standard loss scenarios of the loss maps [11] using singular value decomposition (SVD) or the Gram-
Schmidt (GS) process. Figure 4 (top) shows the loss pattern (loss vector) at the betatron collimators for
horizontal and vertical losses of beam 1 and beam 2. Losses of beam 1 and beam 2 have a very diﬀerent
pattern, but vertical and horizontal losses can only be distinguished at a few collimators. Before decomposi-
tion, the standard loss scenario vectors as well as the unknown loss vectors are normalized to their Euclidean
norm. Figure 4 (bottom) gives SVD decomposition result of 2 hours of physics beam in collision ‘stable
beams’. The factors of the decomposition are calculated every second. During the first six minutes of this
stable beams period beam 1 horizontal losses dominate. Afterwards, the losses are mainly beam 2 horizon-
tal. Vertical losses play a minor role at the beginning, but at the end of this two hours they are comparable in
size to the horizontal losses. The error is the norm of the diﬀerence between the unknown normalized loss
vector and the reconstructed vector. The reconstructed vector is the sum over the four loss scenarios of the
factor of the decomposition multiplied by the standard loss vector of each scenario. The error represents the
fact that the four loss scenarios used in this decomposition cannot fully reconstruct the measured loss.
5. Summary
This paper describes how the LHC BLM system is used to prevent damage of machine components
and magnet quenches, to diagnose the cause of beam losses, and to tune the machine performance. Most
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Fig. 4. Top: Standard loss scenarios for horizontal and vertical losses for both beams as determined by the measurements of the loss
maps. All BLMs in the betatron collimation region are shown with a consecutive index. The four vectors (B1H, B1V, B2H, and B2V)
containing the BLM signals are normalized with respect to their Euclidean norm. Bottom: SVD decomposition results for 2 hours of
physics beam. Plotted are the factors of the decomposition of the measured signals of the BLMs in the betatron collimation region
into the standard loss scenarios shown on the top. Before decomposition, also theses loss vectors are normalized with respect to their
Euclidean norm.
notable are the analysis of the so-called Unidentified Falling Objects (UFOs) and the monitoring of the
collimator beam cleaning performance. Multi-stage test procedures assure the required dependability and
performance of the BLM system. The BLMs have not missed a single beam loss event and there has been
no avoidable quench. All performance parameters fulfill or exceed the requirements. Furthermore, several
system changes which have become necessary since the 2010 start-up have been described.
References
[1] J. Wenninger, “SPS Machine Protection Incident in 2009”, CERN CERN-BE-Note-2009-003, 2009.
[2] B. Goddard et al., “TT40 Damage during 2004 High Intensity SPS Extraction”, CERN, AB-Note-2005-014 BT, 2004.
[3] V. Kain et al., “Material Damage Test with 450GeV LHC-type beam”, CERN, LHC-Project-Report-822, 2005.
[4] B. Dehning et al., “The LHC Beam Loss Measurement System”, PAC 07, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA.
[5] E. Nebot et al., “Handling of BLM Abort Thresholds in the LHC”, IPAC11 proceedings, Spain, 2011.
[6] G. Guaglio, “Reliability of the Beam Loss Monitor System for the Large Hadron Collider at CERN”, PhD Thesis, Universite´
Clermont Ferrand II - Blaise Pascal, CERN-THESIS-2006-012.
[7] B. Dehning et al., “Individual system tests of the LHC beam loss [BLM] monitors”, CERN, EDMS 877031.
[8] E.B. Holzer et al., “MPS aspects of the beam loss monitor system commissioning”, CERN, EDMS 896394.
[9] B. Dehning et al., “Overview of LHC Beam Loss Measurements”, IPAC11 proceedings, Spain, 2011.
[10] E. Nebot et al. “Analysis of Fast Losses in the LHC with the BLM System”; T. Baer et al., “UFOs in the LHC”; N. Fuster
Martinez et al., “Simulation Studies of Macro-particles Falling into the LHC Proton Beam”, IPAC11 proceedings, Spain, 2011.
[11] A. Marsili et al., “LHC Beam Loss Pattern Recognition”, IPAC11 proceedings, Spain, 2011.
M. Nagel, “Pattern Recognition with the LHC Beam Loss Monitoring System”, Bachelor Thesis, Hochschule Karlsruhe, 2012.
A. Marsili, “Identification of LHC beam loss mechanism: A deterministic treatment of loss patterns”, to be published, PhD
Thesis, Universite´ d’Orsay.
